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CASE COMMENTS
played in the crime which determines who is an accomplice. Thus,
not being indicted for the same offense as the principal should not
preclude the person from being found an accomplice.
The Supreme Court of Ohio in State v. McCoy24 affirmed the trial
court's determination that the abortee, a witness for the state, was
an accomplice of the abortionist. Even though the abortee was not
indictable under the identical offense as the abortionist, she was found
to have participated in the unlawful act and therefore was found to
be an accomplice. The court reached this result by invoking a broad
and sweeping statute which stated, "[W]hoever aids, abets, or pro-
cures another to commit any offense, may be prosecuted and punished
as if he was the principal offender." 25 It is often difficult to determine
exactly which of the two tests a court is applying when a broad appli-
cation of the identical offense test is supplemented by a sweeping
accomplice statute,20 as in the McCoy case. The identical offense test
in this situation encompasses many of the characteristics associated
with the criminal corruption test. Therefore, any realistic distinction





Since the prohibition of the eighth amendment of the United States
Constitution against cruel and unusual punishment has not been
extended to the states,' the prevention of such punishments in state
criminal prosecutions is left to the states, subject only to an undefined
control based on the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
of the Federal Constitution.2 State constitutions, though, do contain
2'Supra note 21.
-lbid.
"'Whoever aids, abets, procures, commands or counsels any other person to
commit a crime or offense against the state is an accomplice and is guilty of the
same crime or offense as the principal." Del. Code Ann. tit. ii, § 102(c) (1953).
"'People v. Kupperschmidt, 237 N.Y. 463, 143 N.E. 256 (1924); People v. Hayes
2o App. Div. 549, 206 N.Y. Supp. 556 (1924). The two tests have become almost
indistinguishable in some instances.
1McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155, 158 (1891); Siegal v. Ragen, 88 F. Supp. 996
(E.D. Ill. 1949), aff'd i8o F.2d 785 (7th Cir. 195o), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 990 (195o);
Ex parte Barnard, 52 F. Supp. 102, io4 (E.D. I1. 1943); In re Riddle, 22 Cal. Rptr.
472, 372 P.2d 304, 305 (1962).
2Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o (1962).
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provisions expressly prohibiting the imposition of cruel and unusual
punishments.3
The North Carolina Constitution contains a clause prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishments4 which operates directly on the ju-
diciary.5 In the recent North Carolina case of State v. Blackmon, the
defendant was prosecuted for two crimes: (i) breaking and enter-
ing under section 14-54 of the Statutes which provides for a maximum
sentence of ten years imprisonment7 and (2) possession of tools in-
cident to the accomplishment of the crime under section 14-55 of
the Statutes which prescribes no maximum punishment, but which
provides for punishment within the discretion of the court.8 The
Superior Court of Gaston County found the defendant guilty of both
offenses. He was sentenced to from eight to ten years imprisonment
for breaking and entering and to from twenty to thirty years imprison-
ment for the possession of tools incident to the crime. Thereafter, he
appealed, claiming that the latter sentence constituted cruel and
unusual treatment. The Supreme Court of North Carolina agreed
in light of the fact that the maximum sentence which could be im-
posed under the statute for the crime of breaking and entering it-
self was ten years.
The emergence of this extraordinary situation was due to the
previous adoption by the Supreme Court of North Carolina of an
unsound interpretation of a particular criminal statute. Section 14-2
sKenimer v. State ex rel. Webb, 83 Ga. App. 264, 63 S.E.2d 280 (1951); State
v. Duff, 144 Iowa 142, 122 N.W. 829 (19o9); Jett v. Ferling, 209 Md. 633, 12o A.2d
58o (1956); State ex rel. Lay v. Dictrict Court, 122 Mont. 61, 198 P.2d 761 (1948).
'N.C. Const. art. I, § 14.
5State v. Cain, 2o9 N.C. 275, 183 S.E. 300 (1936).
e2 6o N.C. 352, 132 S.E.2d 88o (1963).
7"If any person, with intent to commit a felony or other infamous crime
therein, shall break or enter either the dwelling house of another otherwise than
by a burglarious breaking; or any storehouse, shop, warehouse, bankinghouse,
counting house or other building where any merchandise, chattel, money, valuable
security or other personal property shall be; or any uninhabited house, he shall
be guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned in the State's prison or county jail
not less than four months nor more than ten years." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-54 (Supp.
1963).
8"If any person shall be found armed with any dangerous or offensive weapon,
with the intent to break or enter a dwelling, or other building whatsoever, and to
commit a felony or other infamous crime therein; or shall be found having in his
possession, without lawful excuse, any pick-lock, key, bit or other implement of
housebreaking; or shall be found in any such building, with intent to commit
a felony or other infamous crime therein, such person shall be guilty of a felony
and punished by fine or imprisonment in the State's prison, or both, in the dis-
cretion of the court." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-55 (1953).
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of the North Carolina Statutes places a limitation on other statutes,
such as the aforementioned section 14-55, which defines crimes with-
out fixing specific punishments.9 The North Carolina Supreme Court
had previously held that statutes providing that punishment should
be in the discretion of the court did impose specific punishments and,
therefore, were not within the scope of the limitations imposed by
section 14-2 on nonspecific punishments.10
In the Blackmon case the Supreme Court of North Carolina was
for the first time confronted with a factual situation which graphically
illustrated the inherent defects of the former interpretation. It is
submitted that the court was clearly correct in rejecting the old rule
that a statutory provision for punishment by fine or imprisonment in
the discretion of the court is specific and that, therefore, the limita-
tions of section 14-2 are inapplicable." Under the newly adopted doc-
trine of the Blackmon decision, statutes providing for punishment in
the discretion of the court are not specific and are, therefore, limited
by the proscriptions of section 14-2 of the North Carolina Statutes.
WELDON J. SMITH
"Every person who shall be convicted of any felony for which no specific
punishment is prescribed by statute shall be imprisoned in the county jail or
State prison not exceeding two years, or be fined, in the discretion of the court, or
if the offense be infamous, the person offending shall be imprisoned in the county
jail or State prison not less than four months nor more than ten years, or be
fined." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-2 (1953).
"State v. Richardson, 221 N.C. 2o9, 19 S.E.2d 863 (1942); State v. Cain, 209
N.C. 275, 183 S.E. 3oo (1936); State v. Swindell, i89 N.C. 151, 126 S.E. 417 (1925).
n132 S.E.2d at 884.
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